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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND,
administered by the Commission of
Finance of Utah,
Petitioner and Plaintiff,
Case No.

vs.

7274

ELBERT I. LUNNEN and THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendants. ·

Defendant's Brief·
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Elbert I. Lunnen had worked for a period of over
twenty years as a welder for Lundin & May Foundry and
Machinery Company. In the course of his duties he was
placed in a position where he frequently and continually
inhaled noxious fumes arising from welding operations.
About five years ago he began to experience a shortness
of breath and without medical diagnosis assumed that
this was in some way connected with the inhalation of
the welding fumes. He made complaint to his employer
1
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at that time and on frequent occasions thereafter. The
shortness of breath became more prono~nced and the
claimant had several periods when it was necessary for
him to lay off work for several days. In 1947 he co11r
tracted pneumonia which resulted in his being away from
work for about six weeks. Finally· on the 8th day of
February, 1948 his shortness of breath became so pronounced that he left work- and reported for treatment to
Doctors Bauerlein and Hatch. He was advised by Doctors
·.Bauerlein and Hatch that his shortness of breath probably in some way resulted from his inhalation of the
welding fumes and he was advised by them that he
should not return to his occupation as a welder. However,
no specific diagnosis of his trouble was ever made at that
time and he was never advised by Doctors Bauerlein
and Hatch that his condition would not clear up so that
he could carry on some gainful occupation other than
as a welder.
At their suggestion he reported to the Industrial
Commission and secured certain blanks to be filled out
by his physicians. These he turned over to Drs. Bauerlein
and Hatch but as a complete diagnosis. was never made,
these forms were not filed with the Commission at that
time. When Drs. Bauerlein and Hatch did not make a
complete diagnosis, Mr. Lunnen reported to Dr. Vernon
Stevenson on July 9, 1948. After a course of observation,
including x-rays, Dr. Stevenson determined on the 28th
day of July, 1948 that the claimant's disability arose
from certain injury to the lungs and diaphragm which he
determined was caused by the inhalation of gasses from
2
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welding operations containing, among other things,
chlorine, manganese, phosphorous and chrome. Dr.
Stevenson also determined and advised the claimant
that his disability \vas permanent and total and that he
would never again be able to carry on gainful employment either as a welder or in any other capacity.
On August 5, 1948 ~Ir. Lunnen filed a written claim
for compensation with the Industrial Commission of
Utah. Thereafter a hearing was held on such claim and
award was made to ~fr. Lunnen. This appeal is taken
from such a\Yard by the Industrial Commission.

CLAil\1: WAS l\1:ADE WITHIN SIXTY DAYS AFTER
DISCOVERY OF THE DISABILITY
In the plaintiff's brief it is maintained that Mr.
Lunnen was aware of the cause of his disability at the
time he quit work on February 8, 1948. It is true that he
was aware in a general way that his illness resulted from
the inhalation of welding fumes.· This opinion was con,.
firmed almost immediately by Drs. Bauerlein and Hatch.
However, such general knowledge is not such knowledge
as would advise the defendant of his right to recover
under the Occupational Disease Act for two reasons. It
will be noted from an examination of Section 42-1a-28
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, that only certain types of
industrial diseases are brought within the coverage of
the Occupational Disease Act. As no complete diagnosis
of the cause of his disability was ever made by Drs.
Bauerlein and Hatch, Mr. Lunnen had no means of know3
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ing that he was within the scope of the Act. It was not
until his examination by Dr. Stevenson that it was determined and he was advised that the chemicals causing his
trouble were, among other things, chlorine, manganese,
phosphorous and chrome, all of which are included within the list cotnained in 42-10-28. Furthermore, not until
the reports of the x-rays were obtained on July 28th was
there anything to indicate that Mr. Lunnen's disability
was permanent and total. In order to qualify a claimant
for an award under the Occupational Disease Act he
must come within the definition ''Disablement'' as set
forth in Section 42-la-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
sub-section la. Only where disability is permanent and
total may a claimant qualify for an award. It will be observed from an examination of the record that Mr. Lunnden had had to quit work on several other occasions
because of irritation of his lungs. However, after a few
days rest he had always been able to return to the job
and resume his work. There was nothing at the time he
quit work on Feb. 8th to indicate that this was not another such occasion and that he would not be able to
return to work of some kind after a period of rest.
When he was examined by Drs. Bauerlein and Hatch
they advised him not to return to his work as a welder
and advised him it would be best for him to move to some
warmer and dryer climate. However, there was no indication given to him at this time that his conditon would
not clear up if he stayed away from the welding operatio~s nor was there any indication that he would not be
able to earn a livelihood in some pursuit other than that
4
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of a welder. When the x-ray findings were made known
to him it was evident that he ha.d adhesions on his diaphragm \Yhich were permanent, that his condition would
not clear up and that he could not work in any capacity.
Therefore, not until July 28, 1948 was Mr. Lunnen able
to determine tha.t he was eligible for an award under the
Industrial Disease Act.
Certainly it cannot be said that there was any lack
of diligence on his part. He consulted doctors as quickly
as he left his employment and when he became dissatisfied with the progress he was making under the first
physicians consulted he changed to another doctor.

THE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE INDUSTRIAL DISEASE ACT DOES NOT ARISE UNTIL A
CLAI1IANT WITH DUE DILIGENCE IS ABLE TO
DETERMINE THAT HE HAS A DISABILITY
WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION
OF THE STATUTE.
The plaintiff in its brief states that there are no
cases decided directly in p-oint with the case now befor.e
the court. The def en dan ts are unable to agree with this
contention. While there are no cases yet decided by this
court there are a number of cases from other jurisdictions passing directly upon the point as to when a cause
of action arises and the time begins to run in Work-;
mens Compensation cases. A case directly in point is the
Cailfornia case of Marsh v. Industrial Commission of
California, 18 Pac. (2d) 933. In that case the Supreme
5
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Court of California had before it three claims, two death
claims and one disability claim. In each case the employee had been engaged in the processing of silica products and had developed a related disease to silicosis.
In each case the claim for allowance had been made beyond the statutory period after the last date of employment. The court disallowed one of the death claims on
another ground but in passing on the question as to when
the time began to run in an occupational disease case so
far as the filing of the claim is concerned the court stated:
'' F:v.om our study of the subject we are
brought to the conclusion that in the case of a
latent and progressive disease such as pneunoconiosis it cannot reasonably be said that the injury dates necessarily from the last day of exposure to a dust laden atmosphere and that the prescriptive period begins to run from that day.
Rather, according to our view, should the cla te of
the injury be deemed the time when the accumulated effects culminating in a disability traceable
to the latent disease as the primary cause, and by
the exercise of reasonable care and diligence it is
discoverable and apparent that a compensable injury "ras sustained in the performance of the
duties of employment.''
Again in the same case the court states:
I

"Our Compensation .~..L\.ct expressly provides
that it shall be liberally construed for the protection of persons injured in the course of their employment, and the purpose of such laws is to
protect workmen, in proper cases, from economic
insecurity. It is not surprising to find, therefore,
that in those jurisdictions where occupational diseases are compensable, it is almost universally
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the rule that the injury is not deemed to occur
until ascertainable disability results. And it may
be noted that in our own state it has been held
that an employee is not to be deprived of compensation because he fails to make a correct medical diagnosis.''
In the Nebraska case of Selders vs. Cornhusker Oil
316, the applic.ant was injured in
Company, 1946 N.
the back by debris violently thrown against him by a
flood of "'"ater. Although the injury was painful and
noticeable the claimant, apparently assuming that he had
merely been bruised, continued at his work as best he
could. The situation got worse and about nine months
later he reported to an x-ray technician, who disclosed
the fracture of a lumbar vertebra. Application for eompensation was made and granted the court holding in
spite of a six months liinitation that the time began to
run not from the date of the injury or disability but from
the time of the discovery of the nature and extent of the
dis a hili ty.

' r·

In the Nebraska case of Kostron vs. American Packing Company, 197 N. W. 615, in awarding compensation
after the running of the statute if the time of the running
were considered to be at the time of the injury the court
stated:
''Accidents frequently occur where the true
nature of the injury and the resulting disability
are not discernible for a considerable time even
with the aid of scientific skill. When latent injuries from accidents do not at first indicate disabilities which are compensable, an employee is
not necessarily deprived of compensation under
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the Workmen's Compensation Act Compiled
Statutes 1922, No. 3056, for failure to demand his
rights under the Act before they can reasonably
be ascertained.' '
A Lousiana case almost exactly in point as the case
now being considered by the Court is Carroll vs. International Paper Company, La. App., 137 So. 907.
In that case the employee suffered a burn on his lip.
The burn itself cleared up but a rather painful lump
remained. After a considerable period of time beyond
the running of the statute if considered from the date of
the injury or from the time of the first appearance of
the lump it was determined that the lump was cancer.
The court in allowing compensation held that the statute
did not begin to run until the nature and extent of the
disability was ascertained.
In the Utah case of Salt Lake City vs. Industrial
Commission, et al, 140 Pac. ( 2d) 644 the court is concerned under the Occupational Injury Act with the date
of notice t~ the employer and not with the time of filing
of the claim and so the case is not exactly in point. How-'
ever, it is certainly persuasive in the case now before
the court in that case a fireman while playing hand ball
in the firemen's gymnasium was struck in the eye with
the ball on October 22, 1940. The i~jury was not thought
to be serious and the immediate symptoms cleared up.
About six months later, however, he began to have
trouble with his eye and about fourteen months after the
injury consulted a physician when it was determined that
8
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he \vas suffering from sarcoma of the choroid and that
the only possible treatment was removal of the eye.
Application for eompensation was filed on March 18,
1942, notice to the employer also being given at about the
same time. It ".,.as contended by the employer that the
compensation should be reduced because of the fact that
notice to the employer was not given within the statutory
period. The court nevertheless upheld the award in this
case.
Another Utah case \vhieh is very persuasive in this
case now before the court is Salt l..;ake City vs. Industrial
Commission, 74 Pac. ( 2d) 657 :
In that case the caretaker of a golf course was struck
in the eye by a golf ball. The injury at first was thought
to be not serious. However, later it began to develop
and some years later resulted in blindness. It was contended that the date of the injury was the date on which
the cause of action arose and the statute began to run.
The Supreme Court admitted that such had formerly
been the rule in the State of Utah but went on to say:
"This line of cases is based on the Utah Consolidated 1\Iinjng Company case, which held that
the applicant must file his application for compensation for disability within one year from the
date of the accident. In this regard we think the
opinion in that case and the cases which followed
it were in error. Since it does not involve a rule
of property on which rights were acquired and
maintained 've think the error should at this time
be rectified. We think Section 104-2-28 Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, which was at the time of
9
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the decision of the Utah Consolidated Mining
Company case known as Section 6468 Compiled
Laws of Utah, 1917, was applicable as a statute
of limitations but that it begins to run not from
the time of accident but from the time of the employer's failure to pay compensation for disability
when the disability can be ascertained * * * ''
An interpretation of when disability can be ascertained is contained in the Connecticut case of Bremmer
vs. Mark Edlitz & Sons, 174 Atl. 172. In that case the
court holds that the disability is apparent not when it is
obvious that the claimant is disabled but when it is obvious that he is disabled from a particular identifiable
disease. The language of the court is as follows :
''The other implication arising out of the
case in question is that there must be a clear
recognition of the symptoms as being that of the
occupational disease in question. However plain
is the presence of the sympton itself unless its
relationship to the particular disease also appears
there can not be said a manifestation of an assumption of that disease.''
While in an ordinary tort case it is true that the
general rule is that a cause of action arises at the time of
the negligent or wilful act, a clear distinction exists between this case and a tort case as in a tort case the liability is predicted upon the wilful or negligent act or
omission of the defendant and therefore his act has come
to rest when the act is done. In the case of an occupa-·
tional disease, however, the liability is not predicted
upon any particular act or omission upon the part of the
defendant but rather merely upon the ultimate disability
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of the employee whether or not there is any fault on the
part of the employer. However, even in tort cases there
are well recognized exceptions to the general rule. For
example in malpractice cases in many jurisdictions the
cause of action arises not at the time the doctor commits
the wrongful act but at the time of discovery. The following language is found at 54 Corpus Juris Secundum,
143:
''In some jurisdictions an exception to the
general rule founded on ignorance of the patient
of the disability is recognized, so that limitations
do not run until the patient knows, or with reasonable diligence should know, of the injury or
cause of dis a hility. ''
In support of this position see the California cases
of Huysman vs. Kirsch, 57 Pac. (2) 908 and. Ehlen vs.
Burrows, 124 Pa.c. ( 2) 82.
In the case of Huysman vs. Kirsch above cited the
California Supreme Court quotes with approval its o'vn
decision in the case of lVIarch vs. Industrial ·Commission of California mentioned above with the following
language:
"We annulled the awards and held that the
date of the injury was not the date of the exposure
nor even the date of the last exposure to>the dust
laden atmosphere but rather the time when the
employees became aware that their injuries were
due to such exposure or when by the exercise of
reasonable care and diligence they might have ascertained that fact. In other words we held that
the statute of limitation did not run against these
employees until they knew the causes of their
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InJury or by reasonable care and diligence
should have known the cause of their injury. Our
decision was amply supported by authorities from
many jurisdictions. The principle running through
all these authorities and approved by our decision
was that the statute of limitation should not run
against an injured employee's right to compensation during the time said person was in ignorance
of the cause of his disability and could not with
reasonable care and diligence ascertain such
cause."
If this court were to hold that the time of the running of the statute is when the claimant ceases to work
even though the exact nature of this incapacity had not
been diagnosed, the only safe course for a person becoming ill and having to quit his job would be to file a claim
immediately even though he had no knowledge that his
disease was within the scopt of the statute. Such certainly could not be the requirement of the legislature.
If a man is aware that he has an occupational disease
that is. within the statute and that he is totally and permanently disabled thereby he should make immediate claim
in order to be fair to his employer and to the insurance
carrier. If he does not make this claim within the statu~
tory period his right to make it is and should be cut off.
Furthermore his right to make such claim should be
cut off if he is not diligent in his efforts to determine
the nature and extent of his trouble. However, to require
a man to submit a claim stating that he is permanently
and totally disabled from an occupational disease which
is within the scope of the statute before he is, with reasonable diligence, able to determine such facts is merely
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requiring a man to perjure himself in order to protect
his rights.
One of the .occupational diseases recognized by said
section 42-la-28, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, is Dermatitis. Counsel is a.divsed by medical experts that in order
to properly diagnose a case of Dermatitis a series of skin
tests often extending over a period of several months is
required. If it were to be held that a· cause of action
arises immediately upon the incurrence qf the disease
the legislature, in the case of Dermatitis, would be giving
a man a right of recovery and then immediately taking
it away from him by a statute of limitations for the reason that the nature of the disease· would prevent him
from determining whether or not he could properly make
a claim prior to the time his claim was barred by the.
statute. Such does not appear to be a reasonable interpretation.
This court and many oher courts have held that
workmen's compensation acts should be liberally construed. Certainly a construction that would require
claimant to make a perjured claim in order to protect his
rights would not be a liberal construction. Furthermore,
if in order to protect their rights every person who becomes ill on the job should be force(! to make an imm·e-.
diate claim before he has discovered whether or not his
illness was merely temporary and would clear up, the
mountainous pile of applications which would necessarily
come into the Industrial Commission would place an
enormous burden on that commis.sion which it could not
bear.
13
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CONCLUSION
There is no question hut that Mr. Lunnen is suffering permanent and total disability resulting from the
inhalation of fumes containing chlorine, manganese,
phosphorous and chrome during the course of his employment nor is there any question that such occupational disease is within the scope of 42-la-28, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943. The only point rais.ed by the petitioner
is as to the date of filing of the claim. As Mr. Lunnen's
claim was filed in writing with the Industrial Commisson well within the sixty days after he had with due
diligence Q_een able to discover that he was suffering
from an occupational disease within the scope of the
statute the award was clearly proper and should be upheld by this court.
Respectfully submitted,

CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General of Utah
ANDREW JOHN BRENNAN,
Assistant Attorney General
PUGSLEY, HAYES &
RAMP TON,
Attorneys for Defendants.
F. A. TROTTIER,
Attorney for Plaintiff.
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